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Abstract 
A CGE model of South Africa is used to find the potential for a ‘double or triple dividend’, if the 
revenues raised from an energy related environmental tax are recycled into households and  
industry through lowering existing taxes. Four environmental taxes and three revenue-recycling 
schemes are compared. The environmental taxes are (i) a tax on greenhouse gas emissions, (ii) a 
fuel tax, (iii) a tax on electricity use, and (iv) an energy tax. The four taxes are constructed such 
that they have a comparable effect on emissions. The revenue is recycled through either (i) a  
direct tax break on both labour and capital, (ii) an indirect tax break to all households, or (iii) a 
reduction in the price of food. A triple dividend is found when any one of the environmental 
taxes is recycled through a reduction in food prices. 
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1. Introduction 
Although classified as a developing country, the South African economy resembles that 
of a developed economy in many respects. It is not surprising that the country’s economy 
has been referred to as being a “double-decker” economy, meaning an economy with 
various layers of income (Sparks 2003). This notion is mirrored by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) (2003) which states that South Africa is a country of 
two societies, one being ranked 18th in the world (the top-deck) and the other 118th (the 
middle and bottom decks) based on gross domestic product per capita. This dichotomy is 
further expressed by the fact that the economic structure of the country resembles that of 
a developed economy (see Figure 1) with a high carbon footprint because of its energy 
intensive manufacturing and services sectors.  
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Figure 1 Percentage contribution to real GDP by industry in South Africa: 20031. 
The dichotomy is also clearly illustrated by the fact that although the countries gross  
national income is considerably smaller than that of upper-middle income countries  
(Table 1); its electricity consumption is 3.8 Megawatt hours (MWh) per capita compared 
to the 2.5 MWh for upper-middle income countries. Coal is the dominant source of  
primary energy supply (see Figure 2) and is used as fuel stock for the generation of 94 
per cent of the country’s electricity. South Africa’s carbon-dioxide emissions lie between 
that of the high-middle income and the high-income countries at 7.4 tonnes (t) carbon 
dioxide (CO2) per capita. 
Because of its peculiar economic structure, the usual economic growth and carbon miti-
gation strategies cannot be applied to South Africa without further scrutinising them. As 
a non-Annex I country according to the Kyoto protocol, South Africa does not have any 
emission reduction targets for the first commitment period, 2008-2012, but this position 
might change after 2012. The concern is that any emissions reduction strategy (voluntary 
or otherwise) could have a negative impact on the economic development potential, as 
well as the much-needed integration of the various income layers. 
                                                   
1  Sources: The South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin, various issues. 
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Alternative policies are sought that could reduce the country’s carbon footprint, while at 
the same time alleviating poverty and stimulating economic development (Blignaut and 
De Wit 2004). 
Table 1 Economic and environmental indicators: 20022. 
  World 
Low 
income
Lower 
middle
Upper 
middle 
High  
income 
South 
Africa 
Population (millions) 6,199 2,495 2,409 329 966 45 
GNI per capita (USD/p.c.) 5,120 430 1,400 5,110 26,490 2,500 
Energy       
Electricity consumption per capita (kWh/p.c.) 2,159 317 1,304 2,505 8,421 3,793 
Share of electricity generated by coal (%) 38.8 49.2 42.5 24.0 37.6 94.0 
Emissions and pollution       
CO2 emissions per capita (metric tons CO2/p.c.) 3.8 0.9 3.0 6.2 12.4 7.4 
 
70%
25%
5%
Coal Crude oil Renewables and waste
Figure 2 Primary energy supply 1998: 4 876PJ3. 
One way to achieve such an integrated policy is to search for double or triple dividends 
through environmental taxes. Although a study searching for such dividends would by 
no means be new to the literature (Bosello et al. 2001, Bossier and Brechet 1995,  
Bovenberg 1999, Fullerton and Metcalf 1997, Jorgenson and Wilcoxen 1993), it is South  
Africa’s concern with poverty alleviation, carbon reduction and at the same time ensur-
ing continued economic growth, that distinguishes this study from related work.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the double dividend concept in 
the context of the paper, followed by a discussion of the data and model in Section 3. 
Section 4 contains the scenarios analysed, Section 5 discusses results, and Section 6  
offers conclusions. 
                                                   
2  Sources: The World Bank. 2003. The little green data book, (from the World Bank  
Development Indicators). Notes: Low-income economies are those with a GNI per capita of 
$745 or less in 2001. 
3  Source: Department of Minerals and Energy. 2000. Energy balance for South Africa: 1998,  
Pretoria.  
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2.  Double dividend 
The search for double dividends is a recurring issue in the literature (Goulder et al. 1999) 
and centres around the question whether there are benefits obtained by an environmental 
policy in addition to the environmental benefits. These benefits, the second or third  
dividend, could be an increase in GDP or the reduction in poverty. It seems to be com-
mon place to distinguish between at least two forms of double dividends (following 
Goulder 1995): weak double dividends when a recycling of environmental tax revenues 
reduce the income losses associated with the environmental tax, and strong double  
dividends when a ‘smart’ environmental tax scheme succeeds to let both income (or 
GDP) and environmental quality increase. The most interesting discussion is related to 
the notion of strong double dividends (we refer to Bovenberg and de Mooij 1994,  
Goulder 1995, and Parry 1997 for more details). One well-known result from the  
theoretical literature is that, through tax interaction, a double dividend is improbable 
(see, e.g., Bovenberg and de Mooij 1994), unless there are initial distortions in the tax 
system or in the market, in which case a tax change might cause an efficiency gain and a 
strong double dividend may be found (see, e.g., Bovenberg and Van der Ploeg 1998). 
Another second dividend, different from the overall income gain, which has received 
special interest in Europe, is an employment dividend from revenue neutral environ-
mental tax reforms. This dividend is easier to obtain than the efficiency or income  
dividend. If, for instance, revenues from the tax are devoted exclusively to cuts in labour 
taxes, the reform might produce an employment dividend even in the absence of a 
(strong) efficiency dividend. Bosquet (2000) surveys 56 different studies and concludes 
that when environmental tax revenues are used to reduce payroll taxes, and if wage  
inertia is prevented, small gains in employment are likely in the short and medium term. 
For employment gains to materialize, the labour market must be flexible. Since we  
empirically study the potential for a triple dividend using a CGE-model, we first review 
the literature on this topic. 
In most of the earlier papers, relatively simple computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
models are used to show that double dividends are unlikely to materialise. The paper by 
Bovenberg and De Mooij (1994) is a good example of this. They use a CGE model with 
competitive markets and labour as the only production factor, and both a clean and a 
dirty commodity as outputs. In their model, the environmental tax – in this case a tax on 
the dirty consumption good – boils down to an implicit tax on labour. It leads to price 
rises, which reduce the real wage. This, in turn, results in a reduction of the labour  
supply. Recycling the revenues from the environmental tax through lower labour taxes 
leads to an increase in the real wage and therefore an increase in the labour supply. Yet, 
the recycling only partially cancels out the fall in labour supply. The reason for this is as 
follows: The environmental tax not only distorts the labour market, but also the com-
modity market: it reduces demand for the dirty good4.  
                                                   
4  In the theoretical tax literature, taxes on intermediate inputs generally have larger welfare 
costs than do equal-revenue taxes on primary factors or final goods for the same reason, i.e., 
they distort both the intermediate input choice and factor markets (Goulder 1995: 288). 
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This is, of course, the intention of the environmental tax reform. However, Bovenberg 
and De Mooij are mostly interested in the possibility of the second dividend. Further-
more, they assume that initially the tax on the dirty good is at its Pigouvian level, and in 
that case, an extra distortion of the distribution of consumption over the two goods must 
decrease total income. 
The effect of the above Pigouvian environmental tax on income can also be understood 
from a tax-base perspective. The reduced demand for the dirty good erodes the base of 
the environmental tax, which means that revenues decrease. This tax base erosion effect 
limits the extent to which the environmental tax can finance a reduction in the labour tax. 
In the end, the shift in taxes must decrease the real wage. Therefore, labour supply drops 
and employment and welfare decline. 
In another paper with similar assumptions, Fullerton and Metcalf (1997) come to the 
same general conclusions. Analysis with a more complicated CGE model in a paper by 
Goulder et al. (1997) also corroborates Bovenberg and De Mooij's results. They include 
intermediate inputs – labour is still the only factor of production – and distinguish be-
tween a tax interaction and a revenue recycling effect. The tax interaction effect meas-
ures the costs of extra distortions due to the higher environmental taxes without lowering 
existing taxes, while the revenue recycling effect measures the benefits of a reduction in 
distortions5. In the above-mentioned models, the tax-interaction effect dominates. 
When more factors of production, labour and capital, are introduced in later papers, there 
appears to be more scope for a double dividend. Another important addition to the analy-
sis described above is the introduction of strategic behaviour into the labour market, for 
example, leading to involuntary unemployment in the initial situation. These papers also 
generally assume an environmental tax that is levied on inputs instead of on a dirty con-
sumption good. Energy is most often used as this polluting input. 
Including a second factor of production (capital) into the analysis introduces the possibil-
ity that a revenue-neutral environmental tax could shift the burden of taxation from one 
factor to another. If there are initial differences in marginal efficiency costs of taxation 
(that is, the loss of overall production efficiency due to taxation, of say labour and  
capital) then the efficiency of the tax system can be increased by shifting the tax from 
the over-taxed factor to the under-taxed factor. According to Goulder (1994), the costs of 
an environmental tax reform will be lower if the following three conditions are met: (i) 
the difference in marginal efficiency cost is large, (ii) the burden of the environmental 
tax falls primarily on the under-taxed factor, and (iii) the revenues from the tax are used 
to reduce the tax rate on the over-taxed factor. He also mentions a more general factor 
influencing the distortionary effects of taxes: its breadth. The broader the tax base, the 
lower the erosion. 
Environmental taxes, however, are relatively narrow by nature because they are meant to 
change specific behaviour. Goulder (1995), Bovenberg and Goulder (1997) and 
Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993) all study the results of a revenue-neutral environmental 
tax reform for the United States with an inter-temporal CGE analysis. Whereas the first 
                                                   
5  The earlier described tax base erosion contributes to the (more general) tax interaction effect 
(Goulder 1994).  
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two studies find no double dividend, the third analysis by Jorgenson and Wilcoxen 
(1993) does find a double dividend if taxes on capital are lowered with the revenues of a 
carbon tax. A double dividend does not materialise if labour taxes are cut instead. This 
fits in nicely with the general notion that the marginal excess burden of capital taxation 
in the US is higher than that of labour. But, the occurrence of a double dividend in this 
analysis may also be explained by the assumed full mobility of capital in the Jorgenson 
and Wilcoxen model, while Bovenberg and Goulder assume that capital is immobile  
between different sectors. The elasticity in capital demand is thus substantially larger in 
the Jorgenson and Wilcoxen model (Bye 2000). 
In contrast to the US, in Europe labour is generally considered over-taxed compared to 
capital, according to Bye (2000). She uses an inter-temporal CGE model for Norway, a 
small open economy characterised by a particularly high marginal excess burden of  
labour taxation. A carbon tax, the revenues of which are used to reduce payroll taxes, 
leads to a small rise in welfare and a reduction of CO2 emissions, which is mainly the  
result of two effects. Firstly, the carbon tax reduces emissions, and secondly, the  
reduction in payroll taxes raises employment. According to Bye (2000), the carbon tax 
works as an indirect tax on capital and, since the marginal excess burden of labour is 
large in Norway, she indicates that the tax reform brings the tax system closer to  
optimality. 
To apply the mechanisms laid out in the above literature to South Africa, we have to  
understand whether, in South Africa, i) energy in production is relatively complementary 
to capital or labour, ii) whether capital and labour are relatively elastic in supply, and iii) 
what the relative tax rates are. To start with, it has been indicated that electricity demand 
is complementary to capital (Blignaut and De Wet 2001), but we could find no compre-
hensive efficiency tax study for South Africa. There have been partial studies on the  
equity aspects of tax policy. Earlier studies concluded that the VAT system in South  
Africa was regressive, implying that differential VAT rates or zero-rating some com-
modities could enhance equity (Fourie and Owen 1993). There are also some studies on 
the relationship between wage inequality and skill bias. Edwards (2001) concludes that 
skills are essential to employment, while Abdi and Edwards (2002) look at the paradox 
of how relative unskilled wages have been increasing at the same time as unskilled un-
employment since the 1970s. 
As far as the tax erosion effect is concerned, South Africa is among those countries with 
the lowest energy prices in the world. The virtual absence of initial energy taxes implies 
that a reduction of the energy demand through increased energy taxes will not lead to a 
reduction in tax revenues. Thus, the costs of a shift in taxes towards energy, in terms of 
lost public funds, are limited. This makes a double dividend more probable. 
With regard to the elasticity of capital and labour supply, savings rates in South Africa 
are low, and capital formation depends to a great extent on foreign capital inflow. The 
capital supply is thereby dependent on trust in present and future institutional quality, 
absence of corruption, secure property rights and low inflation. In that context, a mar-
ginal change in the rate of return on capital may be less important. As for labour, a  
distinction must be made between skilled and unskilled labour. Most skilled labour is 
employed, while unemployment rates for unskilled labourers reach very high levels. In 
abstract terms, we can assume that unskilled labour is in infinite supply, and that the  
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effect of tax shifting on the unskilled labour market will be of major importance for its 
overall effect on output and income. All in all, when energy is complementary to capital, 
and when tax revenue recycling can be used to increase unskilled labour demand, a  
double dividend (similar to that found in the model by Bovenberg and van der Ploeg 
(1996; 1998)) may materialize in South Africa. 
3.  Data and Model 
Emissions data 
South Africa has official greenhouse gas emission inventories for both 1990 and 1994, 
but two complications make it difficult to utilise them for economic analysis. Firstly, the 
data are old and their dates do not coincide with the social accounting matrix (SAM) 
employed in the CGE-model used in this study. Secondly, the inventories are classified 
according to different industrial sectors to those used in the SAM. In light of this, a new 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions database was compiled (Blignaut et al. under review) 
using the national energy balance as published by the South African Department of  
Minerals and Energy (DME 2000). The Department’s energy balances are compiled on 
an annual basis, providing production and consumption data for coal, crude oil, petro-
leum products, natural gas, and electricity in both native units (tons, MWh and kl) and 
standardised energy units (tons of oil equivalent (TOE) and terajoule (TJ)).  
Since the industrial classification of the DME’s energy balances resembles that of the 
SAM, it was possible to compile energy tables by commodity (coal, crude oil and gas, 
petroleum products and electricity) and activity (39 industrial sectors). Using various 
country and gas-relevant emission coefficients, the tables were subsequently used to  
calculate the carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions 
per sector per fuel for 19986, all expressed in terms of CO2-equivalent values. This im-
plies that both the emissions by fuel and sector, and also the energy consumption by fuel 
and sector in both standardised (TJ) and native units have been mapped, creating three 2-
dimensional matrices according to the same industry classification as the SAM. These 
matrices are: 
1. A matrix describing greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the combustion of fuels 
by industry (measured in Gg CO2-equivalents); 
2. A matrix describing energy consumed by the industries. Matrix dimensions are 
“sources of energy” and “industries” (electricity has been added as source of energy); 
and; 
3. The same matrix as in point 2, but in native units.  
Table 2 presents the first two matrices in aggregated form. 
From Table 2, it is clear that the combustion of coal is the main source of CO2 emissions 
in South Africa, accounting for approximately 75 per cent of all GHG emissions. These 
coal-based emissions originate from the generation of electricity and petroleum (South 
Africa is one of the few countries in the world that produces petroleum from coal). 
                                                   
6  1998 was selected because it corresponds to the SAM used, but the same methodology could 
easily be applied to the latest energy balance for the country, namely 2002. 
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Table 2 Greenhouse gas emissions and energy consumption by fuel and sector in  
                        South Africa: 1998. 
 Emission from (Gg) 
  Renewables Coal Crude oil,  
petrol & gas 
Petroleum Total 
Coal -   22  3  940   965 
Crude petr. & gas -  -  11  274   285 
Petr. refineries -  53,704 7,286 -  60,990 
Electricity 4,608  173,802 - -  178,410 
Agriculture -   381 - 6,850  7,231 
Mining1  -  3,113  14 1,756  4,883 
Manufacturing2 -  26,862 4,810 3,191  34,863 
Services3 -  1,997  7 38,755  40,759 
Residential 18,666  3,904 - 1,979  24,549 
Total 23,274  263,785 12,131 53,745  352,935 
 
 Final demand for energy (TJ) 
 Renewables Coal Crude oil,  
petrol & gas 
Petroleum Elect. Total 
Coal -   284  56 12,929 11,029   24,298 
Crude petr. & gas -  -  193 3,766  25   3,984 
Petr. refineries -  253,359 2,738 - 4,390   260,487 
Electricity -  - - - -   - 
Agriculture -  4,958 - 94,150 21,406   120,514 
Mining1  -  40,699  249 24,154 94,667   159,769 
Manufacturing2 -  350,680 71,488 43,605 257,127   722,900 
Services3 -  25,807  117 538,953 73,924   638,801 
Residential 190,400  50,483 - 27,033 108,587   376,503 
Total 190,400  726,270 74,841 744,590 571,155  2,307,256 
Notes: 
1  Excluding Coal, Crude, petroleum and gas. 
2  Excluding Petroleum refineries. 
3  Excluding Electricity. 
Source: Own Calculations based on energy balance for 1998. 
 
Another major source of greenhouse gas emissions is the combustion of petroleum prod-
ucts by motor vehicles, indicated here under ‘Services’ (retail trade specifically). We al-
located these emissions to the respective users of the fuel, i.e. households and industries, 
according to the SAM weights. Of considerable concern are the emissions produced by 
the combustion of biomass (renewable resources), since they mainly reflect the use of 
fuel wood by rural households (due to the absence of grid electricity), as well as the  
occurrence of wild fires.  
Emissions from sources related to activities other than the combustion of fossil fuels, i.e., 
agriculture residuals (mainly methane) are excluded from the database. It should be 
noted that the final demand series in Table 2 presents final energy consumption and does 
not include the use of energy resources in the production of other energy resources, e.g. 
the use of coal to produce electricity or petroleum.  
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Furthermore, the loss of energy during the conversion from coal to petroleum (account-
ing for approximately 10 per cent of the emissions) is also not accounted for under final 
energy demand.  
The model 
The model is similar to the general equilibrium ORANI-G-model of the Australian 
economy, and is written and solved using GEMPACK (Harrison and Pearson 1996). In 
general, the model allows for limited substitution on the production side, focusing rather 
on substitution in consumption. It is a static model with an overall Leontief production 
structure and CES sub-structures for (i) the choice between labour, capital and land, (ii) 
the choice between the different labour types in the model, and (iii) the choice between 
imported and domestic inputs into the production process. Household demand is mod-
elled as a linear expenditure system that differentiates between necessities and luxury 
goods, while households’ choices between imported and domestic goods are modelled 
using the CES structure. 
The model is based on the official 1998 social accounting matrix (SAM) of South Africa, 
published by Statistics South Africa (SSA 2001). This SAM divides households into 12 
income and 4 ethnic groups, and distinguishes 27 sectors. For the purpose of this study, 
we further split the energy and water intensive sectors into 39 sectors. The elasticities 
used for the CES functions in the model have been taken from De Wet (2003). 
The model’s closure rules reflect a short-run time horizon. The capital stock is assumed 
to be fixed, while the rate of return on capital is allowed to change. Labour supply is 
modelled differently in comparison to the Australian-based ORANI, which employs an 
elastic demand and supply for its short-run closure. The South African labour market is 
characterised by large unemployment of unskilled labour, and a shortage of skilled  
labour. The model differentiates between 11 different labour groups that are classified as 
either skilled or unskilled. Skilled labour is treated as human capital with inelastic short-
term supply. This approach applies to seven labour categories: legislators, professional 
workers, technicians, clerks, service industry workers, skilled agricultural workers, and 
craftsman. Unskilled labour is assumed to be perfectly elastic, with fixed real wages. 
This approach applies to three labour categories: elementary workers, domestic workers, 
and operators. The distinction between skilled and unskilled labour supply reflects the 
South African labour market realistically and allows investigation of the effect of certain 
policies on the levels of employment of unskilled labour. The supply of land is also as-
sumed inelastic. 
With reference to the macroeconomic variables, it is assumed that aggregate investment, 
government consumption and inventories are exogenous, while consumption and the 
trade balance are endogenous. This specification gives us an insight into the effect of the 
suggested policies on South Africa’s consumption and competitiveness. All technologi-
cal change variables and all tax rates are exogenous to the model. Finally, the nominal 
exchange rate is set to be the numeraire in each of the simulations. 
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4.  Scenarios 
The focus of this paper is on whether an appropriate recycling of tax revenue following 
energy related environmental taxes could result in double or triple dividends. To answer 
this question various taxes, as well as revenue recycling scenarios, are analysed.  
Tax instruments for carbon reduction 
Seven policy simulations are run: four simulations to analyse the effects of various  
environmental tax instruments and three simulations to analyse recycling schemes. The 
environmental tax instruments are the following: (i) a carbon tax, (ii) a fuel tax, (iii) an 
electricity tax, and (iv) an energy tax.  
The first scenario is a carbon tax of R35 per ton of CO2. This is equivalent to 5 USD/ton 
CO2 and is based on the conservative estimate of Sandor (2001), who estimated the 
global damage cost of a ton of CO2 as being between USD 5 and USD 10. This tax has a 
broad base and captures all emissions at source of combustion (and hence emission), and 
is applied to the CO2-equivalent emission by sector. From an environmental perspective, 
this tax would be the best alternative since it is directly linked to the environmental ob-
jective of a reduction in CO2-emissions. However, such a tax would be difficult to ad-
minister, since no independent air quality monitoring system exists in South Africa, and 
emissions are not accounted for on a regular basis.  
The second scenario is, administratively, relatively easy to implement: namely a fuel tax 
of 4,330 R/TJ, 2,337 R/TJ, and 2,454 R/TJ on the final consumption of coal, crude oil 
and gas, as well as petroleum. This tax is calculated as the carbon tax (35 R/tonCO2) 
multiplied by the carbon content per energy unit of the fuels (124, 67, and 70 tons 
CO2/TJ, respectively). Under this scenario the intermediate consumption of coal, crude 
oil and gas, and petroleum products are taxed, as well as the household consumption of 
petroleum. This tax has a narrower base than the carbon-tax, since the energy loss from 
converting coal to petroleum is excluded from the base. A difficulty that arises is that  
petroleum from crude oil and petroleum from coal are perfect substitutes for each other; 
the former is produced with a fairly clean technology, while the latter is very dirty. We 
have not succeeded in taxing them at different rates.  
In scenario three, a tax is levied on all intermediate and household consumption of  
electricity. Several studies have been conducted to estimate the global damage cost of 
greenhouse gas emissions related to electricity generation (for a summary of these, see 
Blignaut and Zunckel 2004: 298-303). These studies conclude that the global damage 
cost is between R20 (approximately USD 3) and R80 (approximately USD 11) per ton of 
CO2, and translates to between R0.01/kWh and R0.04/kWh of electricity consumption 
(Blignaut and Zunckel 2004: 302). In this paper, the impact of a tax equal to R38/MWh 
is modelled and calculated in the same way as scenario two, namely as the carbon tax 
(35 R/ton CO2) multiplied by the average carbon dioxide emissions per electricity output 
(1.095 ton CO2/MWh). In SI units, the tax level is equivalent to an electricity tax of 
10,651 R/TJ, using the conversion of 1MWh = 0.0036TJ. The gap between the electric-
ity tax and the fuel tax levels is due to the conversion losses when fuels are converted to 
electricity. 
Fighting CO2 pollution and poverty while promoting growth 10
Lastly, in scenario four, a tax is levied on intermediate and household consumption of 
energy7 – a combination of scenarios two and three, but in SI units. This tax is compara-
ble to scenario one (except for the exclusion of the conversion losses from coal to petro-
leum which accounts for approximately 10 per cent of the emissions), but based on the 
consumption of energy and not the level of emissions itself.  
Recycling schemes 
Three recycling schemes are analysed, namely: (i) a decrease in direct tax, (ii) a decrease 
in indirect tax, and (iii) a decrease in taxes on food. These recycling schemes are as  
politically sensitive as the respective tax instruments discussed above. The chamber of 
business in South Africa prefers the reduction of direct taxation (which is progressive), 
while the labour unions prefer a reduction in indirect taxes (which is regressive). All 
households, however, would benefit from a reduction in food prices.  
The first recycling scenario implies a reduction in capital and labour taxes. The second 
scenario implies a reduction in the general value added tax (VAT) rate, while the third 
scenario is a reduction in the VAT-rate on food. All three scenarios would be simple to 
administer.  
Target variables 
Four target variables are calculated by the model, and utilised as instruments to guide our 
policy conclusions, namely (i) CO2 emissions, (iia) GDP, (iib) employment, and (iii) to-
tal consumption by the poor. All the target variables are expressed in ‘per unit of  
government revenue’, so that different policy scenarios could be compared to each other. 
Therefore, the target variables presented in the next section are:  
(i) The change in Gg CO2 per billion Rand government revenue;  
(iia) The percentage change in real GDP per million Rand; 
(iib) The percentage change in total employment per billion Rand; and  
(iii) The percentage change in total consumption by the poorest household group per  
billion Rand, by ethnic group.  
These target variables have been specifically chosen since they reflect the elements  
necessary to ascertain whether energy related environmental taxes would yield various 
economic/environmental dividends if recycled through the economy. Furthermore, 
changes in these variables would also reflect the much-needed structural changes to  
address the specific peculiarities of the country’s “double-decker” economy referred to 
earlier.  
5. Results 
Overview of results 
Table 3 provides a summary of model results of the environmental tax simulations and 
recycling schemes. In brief, two forces are at play in the model when new environmental 
taxes are levied: (i) taxes increase the cost of production and therefore decrease the  
                                                   
7  Since poor households consume coal for basic energy purposes, we exclude them from the 
tax on coal – they only pay the environmental tax on petroleum products and electricity. 
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supply of most commodities, while (ii) the increase in government revenue without an 
accompanying increase in government spending decreases overall demand. With supply 
being very inelastic (as a result of inelastic capital supply as well as supply of skilled  
labour), the fall in demand causes a significant fall in price levels, and only a small  
decrease in real GDP. The fall in domestic prices causes increased exports of most  
commodities, and even coal, which is not the most desirable result in the context of the 
goals of the tax policies. Equilibrium levels of household consumption and imports fall. 
The recycling schemes have similar effects, with opposite signs. 
Table 3 Results of key variables from the modelling simulations. 
Environmental tax Recycling scheme
 CO2 Fuel Electricity Energy Dir tax VAT Food 
Percentage change in        
Real total consumption -1.680 -0.714 -1.017 -1.728 0.963 0.372 0.893 
Investment 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Government expenditure 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Exports 2.596 0.887 1.608 2.466 -1.724 -0.647 -1.411 
Imports -0.930 -0.595 -0.563 -1.140 0.436 0.165 0.477 
Real GDP -0.201 -0.093 -0.113 -0.213 0.084 0.037 0.104 
Consumer price index -1.410 -0.791 -1.045 -1.788 0.980 -0.117 -0.353 
Investment price index -1.085 -0.518 -0.721 -1.210 0.381 0.141 0.252 
Government price index -2.490 -1.218 -1.661 -2.822 0.712 0.255 0.485 
Export prices -0.511 -0.176 -0.319 -0.486 0.349 0.130 0.285 
Import prices 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
GDP deflator -1.732 -0.876 -1.196 -2.020 0.913 0.036 -0.065 
Nominal exchange rate 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Unskilled employment -0.824 -0.384 -0.537 -0.926 0.359 0.181 0.517 
Skilled employment 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Intermediate prices of         
Agriculture -1.043 -0.493 -0.783 -1.246 0.628 0.225 0.853 
Coal -0.859 -0.428 -0.440 -0.849 0.140 0.051 0.085 
Other Mining -0.159 -0.131 0.060 -0.065 0.065 0.022 0.037 
Crude Oil and Gas -3.668 -1.900 -0.535 -2.438 0.222 0.083 0.111 
Food -1.702 -0.822 -1.118 -1.893 0.954 0.350 1.877 
Petroleum 0.565 0.048 -0.458 -0.381 0.465 0.174 0.249 
Iron and Steel 1.509 2.005 0.912 2.997 0.201 0.075 0.121 
Other Manufacturing -0.943 -0.448 -0.539 -0.957 0.412 0.151 0.259 
Electricity 11.770 -1.871 -4.824 -6.549 0.886 0.359 0.588 
Transport Services -1.375 -0.670 -1.019 -1.644 0.694 0.266 0.409 
Other Services -2.562 -1.286 -1.685 -2.909 1.133 0.433 0.681 
% change in production of         
Agriculture -0.035 -0.017 0.025 0.004 0.168 0.073 0.331 
Coal 0.908 0.517 0.517 1.011 -0.413 -0.145 -0.266 
Other Mining 0.692 0.648 -0.398 0.226 -0.317 -0.108 -0.193 
Crude Oil and Gas -1.011 -0.585 0.407 -0.188 -0.149 -0.052 -0.102 
Food -0.194 -0.077 -0.164 -0.240 0.310 0.120 1.136 
Petroleum -2.198 -1.181 0.038 -1.153 -0.013 -0.003 -0.022 
Iron and Steel -5.347 -7.379 -3.280 -10.603 -0.985 -0.367 -0.652 
Other Manufacturing 0.736 0.327 0.352 0.663 -0.189 -0.069 -0.166 
Electricity -4.942 -0.378 -2.239 -2.626 0.200 0.093 0.119 
Transport Services -0.270 -0.231 -0.013 -0.252 0.203 0.096 0.152 
Other Services -0.043 -0.046 -0.030 -0.076 0.123 0.051 0.085 
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First dividend: environmental effects 
For each target variable, scenarios are interpreted in terms of changes in the target vari-
able, divided by changes in the overall tax revenues, in real terms. For the first dividend, 
the CO2 emission reductions, we calculate the change in emissions divided by the change 
in total tax revenues for all four climate change tax instruments and for the three recy-
cling schemes. These numbers are presented inTable4. We see that a carbon tax reduces 
CO2-equivalent emissions by 1.051 Gg CO2 per billion Rand increased tax revenue.  
Recycling the extra tax revenues through an indirect tax break increases emissions by 
0.048 Gg CO2 per billion Rand tax revenue. Thus, together, the combination of the two 
policies reduces emissions by 1.003 Gg CO2 per billion Rand tax revenue that is recy-
cled. The first dividend materializes. This is not too surprising; replacing a broad tax 
scheme by a specific environmental tax usually lowers the environmental burden. 
Table 4 Marginal change in CO2-equivalent emissions, and an indication of  
scenarios that result in a CO2 dividend (numbers present change in CO2 
emissions in Gg CO2 per billion Rand tax revenue). 
  Recycling scheme 
  Direct tax break Indirect tax break Food tax break 
Environmental tax  0.025 0.048 0.019 
Carbon tax 1.051 + + + 
Fuel tax 0.610 + + + 
Electricity tax 0.787 + + + 
Energy tax 0.714 + + + 
The production of industries that are targeted by the tax decline the most, namely the 
production of industries combusting the most fuels. The most severely affected indus-
tries are Iron and Steel, Electricity, Petroleum Refineries, and Crude Oil and Gas. The 
climate change policy does not result in reduced production for the coal industry. On the 
contrary, production increases due to an increase in exports. This actually happens with 
all four environmental tax scenarios.  
The marginal change in CO2-equivalent emissions per Rand is larger for the carbon tax, 
since it incorporates all emissions (including the conversion related emissions), while the 
fuel tax does not. A large quantity of energy is lost in the ‘petroleum from coal’ process, 
which is not taxed with the fuel tax. This explains the lower value for the fuel tax. The 
electricity tax is much higher in absolute terms, to allow for the fact that some emissions 
are not included. However, its effect is similar to that of the fuel tax, because demand for 
electricity is inelastic. The energy tax is just a combination of the fuel and electricity 
taxes, and hence of the same magnitude as these two. 
Second dividend: GDP and employment effects 
The typical second target variable studied in the double dividend literature is GDP, or 
output. The change in GDP divided by the change in total tax revenues is referred to as 
the ‘marginal excess burden’ (MEB) of a tax, or, alternatively: 
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 MEB = change in real GDP/change in real government income8   (3) 
For our analysis we use this variable more generally, and calculate the marginal excess 
burden for the carbon tax, the fuel tax, the energy tax, the electricity tax, and the three 
recycling tax schemes. By comparing MEBs of different scenarios, we find combinations 
of scenarios that produce a second dividend, i.e. an increase in GDP while maintaining 
total government revenues as constant. 
Table 5 presents the MEBs for GDP, and lists the consequences of all scenario combina-
tions. The four environmental tax instruments are associated with losses of GDP per 
change in real government revenues of 0.141, 0.148, 0.145, and 0.152 for the carbon tax, 
fuel tax, electricity tax, and energy tax respectively. These numbers should be interpreted 
as follows: When a carbon tax is levied such that government revenues increase by 1 
million Rand, then real GDP decreases by 141 thousand Rand. Similarly, the MEBs are 
calculated for the recycling schemes, producing values of 0.101, 0.136, and 0.155 for the 
direct tax break, indirect tax break, and food tax break respectively. We conclude, for 
example, that the combination of a carbon tax with a direct tax cut, maintaining constant 
total tax revenues, decreases GDP slightly. This is marked with a ‘–’ in the table. Also, 
when we recycle the carbon tax revenues through an indirect tax cut, net GDP decreases 
slightly. 
Table 5 Marginal excess burdens of different tax instruments, for GDP, and an 
indication of scenarios that result in a GDP dividend. 
  Recycling scheme 
  Direct tax break Indirect tax break Food tax break 
Environmental tax  0.101 0.136 0.155 
Carbon tax 0.141 – – + 
Fuel tax 0.148 – – + 
Electricity tax 0.145 – – + 
Energy tax 0.152 – – + 
The reduction in taxes on food consumed by households increases GDP more than the 
reduction experienced when levying a carbon tax. This is marked with a ‘+’ in the table, 
signalling a positive dividend for the specific policy combination. Table 5 shows that all 
four environmental taxes are more distortionary than a general direct or indirect tax, 
which makes these two recycling schemes ineffective in combination with the environ-
mental taxes. However, as long as the revenue is recycled through a decrease in taxes on 
food, it doesn’t matter which one of the environmental taxes is implemented, a double 
dividend will be found.  
Employment and GDP are closely linked in the model, as low-skilled labour is the  
production factor with the highest elasticity of supply. Qualitatively, the employment  
effects are very similar to the GDP measure given in the MEBs of Table5. We calculated 
the percentage change in employment per one billion Rand change in real government 
revenue for each of the seven tax regimes. Comparing the effects of the environmental 
taxes with the effects that the three means of recycling would have, we find slightly  
different results than in Table 5. 
                                                   
8 For readers familiar with MCPF (marginal cost of public funds): the MCPF is equal to 1+ MEB. 
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Table 6 Marginal change in employment (number of employed people per billion 
Rand tax revenue), and an indication of scenarios that result in an  
employment dividend. 
  Recycling scheme 
  Direct tax break Indirect tax break Food tax break 
Environmental tax  0.0143 0.0221 0.0257 
Carbon tax 0.0196 – + + 
Fuel tax 0.0206 – + + 
Electricity tax 0.0234 – – + 
Energy tax 0.0225 – – + 
A double dividend is found for all tax combinations that include recycling through a 
food tax break, as well as for some combinations with an indirect tax break. According 
to the double dividend literature, this would happen if (i) employment of unskilled  
labour9 increases through the recycling scheme or if (ii) capital10 is complementary to 
energy in the model, even though fixed. Both of these are true in the model, and tie in 
with reasonable assumptions about the situation ‘on the ground’ in South Africa, so that 
we are not surprised to see the double dividend here. The two industries most affected by 
the environmental tax are iron and steel, and electricity, both very capital intensive in  
nature. The average real wage paid by producers decreases where we have a + in Table 
6, indicating that employment of unskilled labour increases. 
The carbon tax proves to be the least distortionary tax, with the lowest MEB. Its base is 
the broadest, including the emissions related to petroleum from coal. Likewise, the fuel 
tax is less distortionary than the tax on electricity. Not all fuel is produced from coal, 
while almost all electricity is. The latter production process involves more emission 
losses, and hence provides a narrower base for taxation. In terms of the MEBs in Table 
5, the two policies with slightly fewer positive effects on GDP (namely on fuel and  
electricity), render some weighted average of their MEBs when combined on energy. 
The indirect tax break is more distortionary than the direct tax break in terms of both 
GDP and employment. Usually a VAT is expected to be less distortionary than direct 
taxes, because it excludes investment and exports, and thus stimulates them. However,  
in our short run, closure investment is exogenous, and therefore not stimulated. The tax 
base is restricted to household expenditure, a much narrower base than that of the direct 
tax, which includes total GDP from the income side. 
The tax break on food has the highest MEB, and this could have a number of explana-
tions: (i) Consumption by households is a function of post-tax wages received by them. 
These wages increase with both the general indirect and food tax breaks, which increases 
real consumption by households. Since only unskilled labour is flexible, and their major 
consumption basket contains much food, the food tax break increases GDP more than 
the general tax break. (ii) The food tax break increases demand for food; the food indus-
try has high inputs from agriculture, which uses relatively more unskilled labour. Total 
agricultural production increases with this scenario. 
                                                   
9  The elastic factor of production. 
10  The inelastic factor of production. 
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Third dividend: Effects on poverty 
In this section we discuss the effects of the various policy scenarios on consumption of 
households. There are twelve household income groups in the model and the results are 
shown for the poorest income group, and four race groups, namely Africans (a),  
Coloureds (c), Indians (i) and Whites (w). We analyse the impact of policies on income 
distribution by considering racial disparities, because, even though average income  
statistics imply that South Africa is a middle-income country, most of the population  
experience serious absolute poverty or are vulnerable to poverty (May 2000; Klasen 
2000; Woolard 2002). Poverty levels in South Africa are highest within African and 
Coloured race groups. In 1995, 61% of Africans, 38% of Coloureds, 5% of Indians and 
1% of Whites were classified as poor (May 2000). Aliber (2002) quoting Schlemmer’s 
work based on the All Media and Products Surveys (AMPS) shows that overall poverty 
has been increasing since 1993. A poverty line of R400 in 1989 Rand prices was used. 
Furthermore, the data also shows that Africans and Coloureds have been the worst  
affected in terms of increasing poverty over the years. The table below shows this  
evidence. 
Table 7 Proportion of households below poverty line, by year and population group. 
 Africans Coloureds Indian White 
1989 51% 24% 6% 3% 
1993 50% 26% 8% 3% 
1996 57% 22% 9% 3% 
1997 55% 21% 6% 4% 
2001 62% 29% 11% 4% 
Source:  Aliber quoting Schlemmer 2002: 3. 
Table 8 shows the results of the calculations of the percentage change in real consump-
tion per unit of change in real government revenue. Two results stand out from the table: 
1) A fuel tax seems to have more positive results than other environmental taxes. 2) A 
food tax has only positive results and it does not matter which environmental tax is  
levied, as long as recycling takes place through a food tax break, consumers benefit. 
Poor consumers spend most of their consumption basket on food, so this result is to be 
expected.  
The results in the table show that the poorest household group would generally prefer a 
fuel tax to a carbon tax, as well as an electricity tax.  
A carbon tax affects electricity prices severely, which provides a common explanation: 
food uses more electricity than fuel as a source of energy, so an electricity tax leads to a 
higher price increase of food than a fuel tax.  
To verify the robustness of our results, we also calculated the potential for a double  
dividend for the three poorest household groups, as opposed to only the poorest group. 
The results show the same signs as the results shown here for the poorest household 
group. 
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Table 8 Marginal change in poverty (change in real consumption of poorest house-
hold groups per billion Rand tax revenue), and an indication of scenarios 
that result in a poverty dividend. 
  Recycling scheme 
  Direct tax break Indirect tax break Food tax break 
Environmental tax   a=0.066 
c=0.075 
i=0.060 
w=0.065 
a=0.091 
c=0.099 
i=0.082 
w=0.097 
a=0.359 
c=0.391 
i=0.338 
w=0.299 
a=0.126 – – +    
c=0.113  –    –    +   
i=0.077   –    +    +  
Carbon tax 
w=0.230    –    –    + 
a=0.081 –    +    +    
c=0.075  0    +    +   
i=0.069   –    +    +  
Fuel tax 
w=0.083    –    +    + 
a=0.165 –    –    +    
c=0.122  –    –    +   
i=0.080   –    +    +  
Electricity tax 
w=0.266    –    –    + 
a=0.129 –    –    +    
c=0.102  –    –    +   
i=0.076   –    +    +  
Energy tax 
w=0.186    –    –    + 
 a = African, c = coloured, i = Indian, w = white. 
Reaping the dividends 
A summary of the simulation results is given in Table 9. Since all tax instruments stud-
ied are tailored towards curbing greenhouse gas emissions, they all contribute to the first 
environmental dividend. Only the policy combination that involves a recycling scheme 
through a cut in taxes on food achieves a double dividend - an increase in GDP and em-
ployment per unit of government revenue. The poverty dividend is always reaped 
through a food tax break, and through a fuel tax that is recycled through an indirect tax 
break.  
Tabel 9 Summary of dividends (greenhouse gas emissions, GDP and employment, 
and poverty). 
 Recycling scheme
Environmental tax Direct tax break Indirect tax break Food tax break 
Carbon tax + – – + – – + + + 
Fuel tax + – – + – + + + + 
Electricity tax + – – + – – + + + 
Energy tax + – – + – – + + + 
Van Heerden et al. 17
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we calculated the values of three key variables for four environmental tax 
scenarios and three recycling schemes. We are now ready to choose one combination of 
these that would be best for South Africa, from the summary of dividends in Table 9.  
The choice of environmental tax lies between a carbon tax and a fuel tax. Both render 
triple dividends with a tax break on food. The carbon tax has a much stronger environ-
mental effect than a fuel tax11, because all emissions related to the conversion of fuels 
into energy is included in the tax base, while they are excluded from the fuel tax base. 
Also, the carbon tax has a lower GDP and employment cost12 for the same reason. The 
fuel tax is slightly better for poverty reduction, since it renders the poverty dividend 
through a general decrease in indirect taxes to households as well.  
The direct tax break is not suitable for South Africa, because it does not render a second 
nor a third dividend with any environmental tax. The direct taxes have smaller GDP and 
employment effects than any of the environmental taxes, because both capital and skilled 
labour have inelastic supply characteristics. 
Both the indirect and food tax breaks render triple dividends if combined with a fuel tax. 
If the three target variables have to determine which one of the two recycling schemes is 
better, the food tax break renders better results. The environmental effects of both tax 
breaks are minute. However, the food tax break gives much larger GDP and employment 
dividends, because the base is much narrower than a general indirect tax on all com-
modities. Also, since the consumption basket of the poor includes a very large proportion 
of food, a tax break on food has a marked influence on the quantities of all commodities 
they consume. 
We conclude that the best policy combination for a cleaner environment, as well as  
poverty alleviation, would be a carbon tax, recycled through a decrease in taxes on food. 
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